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INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 


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REPORT  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  THE  DIVISION  OF  SAFETY,  COVERING 
THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH  OCCURRED 
ON  THE  KANSAS  CITY  SOUTHERN  RAILWAY  NEAR  AIR  LINE 
JUNCTION,  MO.,  ON  OCTOBER  19,  1914. 

November  9,  1914. 
To  the  Commission: 

On  October  19,  1914,  there  was  a  derailment  of  a  passenger  train 
on  the  Kansas  City  Southern  Railway  near  Air  Line  Junction,  Mo.; 
which  resulted  in  the  death  of  the  engineman  and  the  injury  of  the 
fireman.  After  investigation  of  this  accident,  the  chief  of  the  divi- 
sion of  safety  reports  as  follows : 

The  train  involved  in  this  derailment  was  southbound  train  No.  7, 
consisting  of  one  combination  coach  and  one  coach,  hauled  by  loco- 
motive No.  51,  and  was  in  charge  of  Conductor  Courtway  and 
Engineman  Letters.  It  left  Knoche  Junction,  Mo.,  at  0.25  a.  m., 
10  minutes  late,  bound  for  Independence,  Mo.,  and  at  6.45  a.  m.  was 
derailed  at  a  point  about  1  \  miles  south  of  Air  Line  Junction,  while 
running  at  a  speed  of  about  15  miles  per  hour. 

After  derailment  the  locomotive  turned  over  and  went  down  a 
10-foot  embankment  on  the  right  side  of  the  track.  Both  passenger 
cars  were  derailed,  with  the  exception  of  one  wheel  on  the  rear  truck 
of  the  second  car.  These  cars  remained  at  the  top  of  the  embank- 
ment and  were  undamaged. 

This  accident  occurred  on  a  single-track  line.  Train  movements 
between  Air  Lino  Junction  and  Sugar  Creek  Junction,  between 
which  two  points  this  accident  occurred,  are  governed  by  block 
clearance  cards,  issued  by  operators,  this  block  system  being  absolute. 
The  track  is  laid  with  05-pound  rails,  the  majority  of  which  are  30 
feet  in  length,  single  spiked  to  about  19  oak  ties  under  each  rail,  tie- 
plated  in  places.  Both  two  and  four  bolt  angle  bars  are  used.  The 
track  is  ballasted  with  cinders.  The  derailment  occurred  on  a  curve 
to  the  right  of  5  degrees  10  minutes,  at  a  point  about  100  feet  beyond 
the  beginning  of  the  curve,  at  which  point  the  grade  was  about  1 
per  cent  ascending  for  southbound  trains.  The  approximate  eleva- 
tion on  the  outside  rail  on  this  curve  was  2  inches.  The  weather 
was  clear. 

The  fireman  stated  that  the  first  indication  of  derailment  was 
when  the  engine  began  to  run  along  on  the  ties.     Neither  he  nor  the 

09793—14 


2  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

engineman  had  an  opportunity  of  jumping,  both  goir  m 

the  engine,  the  fireman  being  thrown  clear. 

The  statements  of  all  the  employees  on  train  No. 
the  speed  was  very  moderate  at  the  time  of  deraili  ^xic,  the  t 
having  left  its  last  stopping  point,  less  than  2  miles  distant, 
minutes  prior  to  the  occurrence  of  the  accident. 

Examination  of  the  track  showed  that  the  -wheels  of  the  locomotive 
had  dropped  down  inside  of  the  outer  rail  of  the  curve,  due  to  the 
spreading  of  the  inside  rail.  There  were  flange  marks  on  the  inside 
of  the  webs  of  the  next  two  rails,  which  indicated  that  these  rails  had 
turned  over,  the  locomotive  running  along  on  the  webs.     At  this 


No.  1.— View  of  track  approaching  point  of  derailment  from  the  north. 

point  the  angle  bars  gave  way  and  the  locomotive  ran  over  the  ties 
an  additional  two  rail  lengths  before  the  coupling  was  broken  between 
the  engine  and  tender,  the  engine  turning  over  and  going  down  the 
embankment  on  the  inside  of  the  curve. 

The  track  for  a  distance  of  one-half  mile  on  each  side  of  the  point 
of  derailment  was  found  to  be  in  bad  condition,  and  in  many  instances 
the  gauge  was  tight  at  the  rail  joints  while  at  the  centers  the  rails 
were  spread  outward.  In  some  of  these  cases  the  gauge  at  the  joints 
was  4  feet  8  inches,  while  at  the  centers  it  was  4  feet  9{  inches.  This 
condition  is  shown  in  illustration  No.  1,  a  view  taken  from  the  north, 
looking  toward  the  point  of  the  accident.  Illustration  No.  2  shows 
a  similar  condition  existing  south  of  the  point  of  derailment.  Two 
mils  were  found  with  crescent-shaped  breaks  in  the  flange  on  the 
inside,  one  6  inches  in  length  and  one  11  inches  in  length.     About  50 


ACCIDENT    NEAR   AIR    LINE   JUNCTION,   MO.,   OCTOBER   19,    1914.  3 

qjio-1^  i.M-    were  found  having  only  one  or  two  holts  in  thorn,  this  oon- 

Hio  t<>  the  fact  that  some  of  the  rails  had  no  bolt  holes 

i,  while  others  were  so  badly  matched  that  the  holes  in 

did  not  register  with  the  holes  in  the  ends  of  the  rails. 

-trillion  .v    .  ;;  shows  the  use  of  a  broken  angle  bar  at  a  rail  joint, 

...nlo  illustrations  Nos.  4  and  5  show  the  use  of  angle  bars  in  cases 

where  no  bolt  holes  were  drilled  in  the  rails,  or  the  bolt  holes  in  the 

rails  did  not  match  with  the  holes  in  the  angle  bars.     Twenty-five 

angle  bars  were  found  in  this  mile  of  track  which  were  broken  or  badly 

sheared,  while  in  some  cases  there  were  spaces  of  as  much  as  2  inches 

between  the  ends  of  the  rails. 


No.  2.— View  of  track  south  of  point  of  accident. 

This  examination  of  the  track  also  developed  a  poor  condition  of 
spiking.  Many  could  be  drawn  by  hand,  while  in  other  places  five 
or  six  consecutive  ties  had  no  spikes  in  them.  It  was  also  found  that 
in  some  places  spikes  had  been  loosened  until  they  were  from  three- 
quarters  of  an  inch  to  1  inch  away  from  the  base  of  the  rail;  in  one 
rail  only  two  spikes  out  of  17  consecutive  spikes  on  the  inside  of  the 
rail  were  holding  the  same.  Many  ties  were  found  which  were  not 
in  serviceable  condition,  the  ends  being  broken  off.  Illustration 
No.  6  shows  the  ends  of  broken  ties  which  had  been  allowed  to  remain 
in  the  track. 

Discussing  the  track  conditions,  Division  Engineer  Bayse  stated 
that  the  appropriation  allowed  for  maintenance  on  the  Terminal 
Division,  on  whose  tracks  this  accident  occurred,  was  used  in  the  en- 


4  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

deavor  to  keep  up  the  weak  points  in  order  to  keep  traffic  moving, 
although  they  were  not  always  successful  in  doing  this  before  acci- 
dents occurred.  Mr.  Bayse  further  stated  that  the  track  on  which 
this  derailment  occurred  was  in  the  same  condition  as  when  he 
took  charge,  one  year   previously,  no    improvement    of  conditions 


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No.  3.— Use  of  broken  angle  bar  at  joint. 

having   been  made,  although  there  had  been  10  or  12  derailments 
in  that  time. 

Locomotive  No.  51  is  a  six- wheel  switching  locomotive.  It  is  not 
adapted  to  passenger  service,  but  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the 
locomotive  regularly  assigned  to  this  run  had  been  in  the  shops  since 


No.  4. — Use  of  angle  bars  no1  matched  with  boles  drilled  in  rails,  or  where  no  holes  had  been  drilled 

in  rails. 

August,  six-wheel  switching  locomotives  had  been  used  to  haul  this 
train  since  that  time.  Examination  of  locomotive  No.  51  showed 
the  lateral  motion,  flanges,  etc.,  to  be  in  good  condition,  and  there 
was  nothing  about  the  engine  which  it  was  believed  could  have  been 
responsible  for  the  derailment. 


ACCIDENT    NKAl!    All;    LINE    JUNCTION,    MO.,    OCTOBER    19,    1914.         5 

This  accident  was  caused  by  (he  spreading  and  turning  over  of 
three  rails  on  the  inside  of  the  curve,  due  to  the  existence  of  track 
conditions  which  were  so  bad  as  not  to  permit  of  the  operation  of 
trains  in  safety.     These  track  conditions  were  extremely  dangerous, 


No.  ">. — Improper  use  of  angle  bars;  same  condition  as  shown  in  figure  No.  4. 

embracing  bad  ties,  worn  and  bent  rails,  short  and  broken  angle 
bars,  joints  fastened  with  but  one  or  two  bolts,  on  account  of  rails 
undrilled  at   the  ends,   or  angle-bar   holes    not   reo-isterino-  with  the 


No.  6.— Ties  remaining  in  track  with  ends  broken  off. 

holes  drilled  in  the  rails,  loose  and  missing  spikes,  and  track  out  of 
surface,  gauge,  and  alignment. 

In  connection  with  previous  accident  investigations,  attention  has 
been  called  to  the  fact  that  many  derailments  have  been  due  to  the 
existence  of  track  conditions  so  bad  as  to  constitute  a  dangerous 


6  INTERSTATE    COMMEECE    COMMISSION. 

menace  to  the  traveling  public.  In  many  cases  the  speed  of  the 
trains  involved  has  been  a  contributing  factor,  the  speed  limits 
allowed  having  been  higher  than  seemed  to  be  warranted  by  the  track 
conditions.  In  the  case  of  the  accident  here  under  investigation, 
however,  the  question  of  speed  is  not  involved,  there  being  no  doubt 
that  the  track  conditions  existing  in  the  vicinity  of  this  derailment 
were  such  that  trains  could  not  be  operated  with  safety  even  at  low 
speed. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

H.  W.  Belnap, 
Chief  of  Division  of  Safety. 

o 


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